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II
After the cold war, the geopolitical power vacuum
and liberalization – economic privatization and
deregulation – helped create ‘failed’ and ‘rogue’
states. American policymakers ignored the
proliferation of ‘lawlessness’ occurring in power
vacuums because ‘realism’– the theory in which
sovereign states are the main actors on the
international stage – was the dominant international
relations paradigm. Despite the increasing talk of
the capabilities of stateless terrorist and criminal
networks, both the Clinton and Bush administrations
were locked in the old mind-set and did not see how
stateless actors could base their operations in
‘geopolitical black holes.’ Yet on September 11,
2001, the world began to dimly perceive the power of
transnational networks.
Terrorist networks, like the most
successful criminal organizations, are not only part
of the social structure, they exploit it. Thus, the
Bush administration said it would pursue terrorists
as well as its state sponsors. However, this proves
to be more complicated in practice. Both
international terrorism and crime is connected with
the international financial system which unites the
underworld and upper-world. Though the dark side of
globalization has finally been recognized, the rule
of law cannot simply be enforced in the way that
banditry and piracy were once fought because the
licit and illicit have become interwoven into the
social fabric itself. Almost every product and
service interfaces with the black market, although
customers would rather ignore this fact.
Imperialism has become the dominant
subtext for domestic and international affairs
across the news spectrum: from newspapers—concerned
with recording the steady flow of events—to weekly
newsmagazines which interpret current events—turning
news into history. Attempts to portray post 9-11
events has created, what Walter Isaacson calls,
impressionistic history: “Like an Impressionist
painting, it relies on dots of varying hues and
intensity.” The picture of the Bush Presidency, for
example, resembles a jigsaw puzzle in which the
consumer of public information connects the pieces
in accordance with the total meaning that is slowly
emerging from special reports, official interviews,
memoirs of major players and leaks from anonymous
sources. Inside narratives on bureaucratic turf
battles over strategy and policy without
documentation will remain problematical for decades
to come. Until the principal actors inside the Bush
administration provide their view of how decisions
were made as events were unfolding since 9-11, we
simply have no hard evidence to substantiate the
various motives. Yet, regardless of any detailed
elitist account, the fundamental significance of
these events can only be understood in historical
context.
A common thread running through this
changing picture of the Bush administration is the
growing body of observations forming around the
constitutional crisis arising from the so-called
“war on terror.” The imperial presidency of George
W. Bush has curbed the rights and liberties of
individuals and has politically attacked both the
independency of the judiciary and media by using one
of the oldest political tricks in history. The war
on terror has been strategically used to whip up a
panic and thus dismiss dissenting voices as
unpatriotic and soft on terror. Bush has created a
classic situation in which the excesses of power
abroad have led to abuses at home. The concentration
of executive power is seriously challenging
America’s liberal democracy and its developed system
of checks and balances. However, the imperial system
was actually established in the aftermath of the
Second World War and the dissolution of Prussia. The
National Security Act of 1947 reorganized the United
States' armed forces, foreign policy and
Intelligence Community apparatus, and created new
institutions of extra constitutional power, such as
the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency.
It is too simplistic to suppose that
only autocratic administrations or despotic
governments practice imperialism. A nation’s
internal arrangements are irrelevant criteria for
defining imperialism because plenty of democratic
polities have pursued imperial policies. Nor should
liberal governments be seen as a source of weakness.
Liberal constitutions impose constraints on power,
but Paul Starr has shown how this disciplined
constraint makes them strong: “By binding those in
power, making their behavior more predictable and
reliable, and thereby increasing the trust and the
confidence of citizens, creditors, and investors,
constitutionalism amplifies the long-term power and
wealth of a state.” Moreover, from a long term
perspective, Starr argues that warfare with a high
level of mobilization and participation ratio has
created democratizing effects in so far it makes
authority concede power, for example, opening the
way to citizenship, housing and education. In short,
the cycles of Anglo-American history reveal a unique
pattern.
The mass democratic revolutions in 19th
century Europe and North America created a situation
in which urban laborers and frontiersmen began to
demand a say in domestic affairs. Though the great
influx of laborers and the dissemination of radical
ideas throughout the second half of the 19th
century brought the whole problem of mass against
class to the fore, the vagaries of the mass mind
were something statesmen could, more or less, ignore
since it did not significantly impinge on the
conduct of diplomacy and war. Napoleon III, Disraeli
and Bismarck never really cared much about what the
masses thought about geopolitics. They rather
manipulated the mass mind through the control of the
press. International affairs belonged securely in
the hands of the gentlemanly classes and the
enlightened public. After the tragedy of the First
World War, attitudes limited to a small circle of
elites had to defer to the public’s aversion to war.
The man in the street has become more insistent
about his right to express his opinion on
international as well as domestic affairs;
consequently, weakening the resolution of
governments’ international commitments and
objectives. The heightened importance of public
sentiment necessitated the growth of publicity and
propaganda. The irruption of anti-imperial sentiment
expressed in Britain’s opposition press triggered
the counter rhetorical charge which the World War
I-era imperialist intellectuals managed and who are,
incidentally, now, greatly admired by American
neoconservatives.
The figure of the journalist emerged from the Second
World War as history’s acknowledged eyewitness. The
men at the likes of Fox Movietonews, who headed the
first news, newsreel and newspaper expeditions,
quickly recognized the propagandistic power of
celluloid psychology. The mass media have given
audiences a new form of eyewitness accounting of
history through photographic and cinematic
experience. Yet the dispute between American media
and American military is the same as always, which
has always revolved around access. Armies of hired
hacks eager to cover war have as much access that
government officials grant. Now that Western war
correspondents are increasingly being targeted, they
either become embedded within the U.S. military or
risk becoming part of the media spectacle
themselves.
Robert Kaplan has taken the opportunity to
colorfully depict the reality on the ground through
America’s powered-down command structure in a
dramatic as well as credible fashion. He covers
guerilla warfare from the perspective of America’s
N.C.O.’s and imperial grunts on the one hand and
insurgents and terrorists on the other. However, no
journalist can dig deep enough to get to the bottom
of empire, which according to David Rieff “is a
general question, not a particular one, a subject
that may be illuminated by historical and moral
analysis, but not by reportage, no matter how vivid
and valiant.” Indeed, all good investigative
reporting enlivens contemporary history, but the
philosophical implications of empire and imperial
rivalry in the 21st century have to be
discussed in grand historical terms and with an eye
for novelty. In other words, diplomatic and military
maneuvers must be analyzed against a geopolitical
background and wars against long term socioeconomic
trends.
Meanwhile, a new political space has opened up where
one may sense the dark stirrings of the collective
unconscious. Professional journalists and
traditional media institutions, as Time
Magazine’s 2006 person of the year recently
admitted, no longer have exclusive social control of
the globalized informational terrain. The
distinction between amateur and professional
journalists is slowly dissolving with the rise of
new communication media, such as e-mail, web video,
satellite cell phones: text messaging, cameras and
videos. This anarchy of aural, verbal, and visual
media has also revolutionized insurgency and
terrorism. Any small scale violent act can be
symbolically amplified through cyberspace beyond its
actual physical impact. Insurgents and terrorists
are becoming experts at using propaganda and
subversion as an instrument of warfare—making
counterinsurgency even more complicated.
At any rate, interpreting the twin features of
insurgency and counterinsurgency within the
framework of imperialism simplifies our
understanding of current events. Imperial police
actions occur either on sea or land, and involve the
integration of military, intelligence and civil
activities. Because the U.S can project power and
impose sea-lane control anywhere in the world,
international insurgency and terrorism facing the
U.S. today has a minimal maritime dimension. The
U.S. Navy’s effective control of the world's oceans
since World War II is still the most significant
geopolitical fact of contemporary history.
Nonetheless, America’s superior sea and air power
has not been successful in dislodging enemies from
territory, which requires occupation by ground
forces. “That,” Edward Luttwak asserts, “however, is
bound to cost casualties that might not be
tolerated; it is also bound to provoke an
insurgency.”
An insurgency always runs through a given
population, whose support provides insurgents with
the necessary invisibility for avoiding direct
confrontation with advanced conventional forces.
Thus, many liberals assume the only way of defeating
an insurgency and establishing successful governance
is through gaining popular support. For example,
General Petraeus’ manual on counterinsurgency
states: victory will never be achieved until “the
populace consents to the government’s legitimacy.”
Yet according to Luttwak, “the extraordinary
persistence of dictatorships as diverse in style as
the regimes of Cuba, Libya, North Korea, and Syria
shows that in fact government needs no popular
support as long as it can secure obedience,” which
comes into existence through strict authoritative
prohibitions and sure punishment.
First, governments can maintain obedience without
popular support. Second, popular support can take on
diverse forms, depending upon the moral, legal and
ideological principles that constitute a society.
Third, although liberals want to establish order in
Iraq and Afghanistan—being post-imperial
themselves—they never think of security in terms of
conquest, which reveals their propensity to overlook
history. Afghanistan since becoming a nation has
exhibited the sort of instability that one usually
associates with failed states. All invading powers
that have been drawn into its vicinity have paid a
high price in blood and treasure. Mesopotamia, on
the other hand, has essentially been ruled through
either corruption or terror since the British
abandoned the newly created state of Iraq after they
realized that their British-built institutions had
failed to take root. Iraq has simply little
experience with self-governance. At least, history
there shows that obedience can be established when a
strongman dominates the various ethnic tribes.
Past empires always developed strategies of
collaboration, and established social control of a
populace through a system of rewards and threats,
since they lacked the manpower to govern vast spaces
of territory. Instead of hunting down every hidden
rebel, Luttwak tells us, imperial policing involved
going “to the village chiefs and town notables” and
demanding “their surrender, or else.” Imperial power
essentially rests on “social pressure rather than
brute force.” In short, there is no contradiction
between burning down villages and winning the
“hearts and minds” of a populace. In fact,
counter-terror and random massacres are well proven
methods for effectively controlling a broad
population. In the information age, problems arise
when news and brutal images of counter-insurgency
get out, and contradict a democracy’s own liberal
ideology. This issue raises questions concerning the
use of force. Tony Blair’s foreign policy guru
Robert Cooper thinks the postmodern world needs “to
get used to the idea of double standards.” The
British diplomat argues: “Among ourselves, we keep
to the law but when we are operating in the jungle,
we must also use the laws of the jungle.”
The “war on terror" is primarily a global
informational war. Plainly, the use of strategic
communications to spin events or strengthen a
nation’s public image is much more difficult to do
abroad than domestically. Frank Rich’s story of how
the Bush administration sold a war of choice to the
American public by using the latest PR techniques
rested on the collapse of news standards during the
1990s and the rise of “an overheated 24/7
infotainment culture [that] trivialized the very
idea of reality.” Whether one is living in the big
city, suburbs or rural America, reality has been
reduced to what gets filtered through TV. New forms
of instantaneous communication have given rise to
new structures of feeling and thought, yet the
imagery and content of the system continues to be
commercially driven. The new aesthetic and political
order is more conducive to mythical than historical
consciousness, which springs from the brevity of the
public’s attention span and memory.
Myth is a conservative force that is concerned with
preserving the existing order by reinforcing
accepted modes of conduct, and by excluding
alternative solutions to life’s essential conflicts.
In short, manipulation is made easier when man lives
in a state of cultural amnesia, where actions have
neither consequences nor causes. The masses will
never grasp the reasons behind today’s headlines
until they pull themselves out of the pseudo world
of sacred-causality. Investigating current affairs
through the constraints of world history not only
discourages wishful-thinking, but endows one with a
historical sense, as Sir Lewis Namier suggested, “of
how things do not happen.”
In any case, America’s management of minds and the
spectrum is limited. Older notions of
manipulation—propaganda and advertising—have since
the 1970s been replaced with models drawn from the
field of communications theory, which insists that
perception and reception are creative acts. The old
stimulus-response models in which the transmitter of
messages directly influences the behavior of
recipients were replaced by models which acknowledge
the ability of recipients to interpret messages
selectively. The power to change the behavior of a
citizen-consumer through manipulation had been
exaggerated, except in dictatorships where all lines
of communication are centrally controlled. (Yet,
people in dictatorships, at least, know that all
information is controlled, and so are more skeptical
of news than those in democracies.) Theorists, now,
see manipulation in terms of influencing existing
tendencies and shaping the perceptions of
individuals or groups, and even this assumes
intimate knowledge of a culture. Al Jazeera, the
most popular source of news for the Arabic speaking
world since the mid-1990s, depicts a very different
reality from the one Fox or CNN portrays. US public
diplomacy is constantly being preempted by images of
actions that seemingly contradict America’s scripted
messages. The Bush and Blair administration’s Middle
East foreign policy—especially their joint reaction
to Israel’s 2006 invasion of Lebanon—has destroyed
their nation’s credibility in the region for
decades.
The privatization of war and intelligence and the
growth of homegrown Islamic terrorism are two
increasing trends that have arisen since the
collapse of the Soviet Union. An open world
inundated with information enhanced by developments
within communications has radically altered peace
and security. The Pentagon’s newly released estimate
of Private Military Contractors working in Iraq is
around 100,000—far outnumbering Bush’s so-called
“coalition of the willing.” The dramatic increase of
PMCs can partially be explained by the general trend
towards privatization and the need for managing
domestic perception—nobody has to report PMC
casualties. Despite all the hype about the
blogosphere, engaged citizens and the new digital
democracy, al Qaeda propaganda on the Internet is
inspiring and radicalizing alienated—primarily,
second and third generation children of
immigrants—citizens to attack soft targets. Finally,
the director of Britain’s domestic intelligence
agency in 2006 publicly warned of the threat from
within multicultural Europe and North America;
potentially, a greater danger than international
terrorism itself.
Our goal is not to judge whether this
new drive towards empire is good or bad, either for
the United States or the world. We neither wish to
approve nor disapprove, our aim rather is to simply
understand this new universe of discourse, which is
divided between supporters, who argue that liberal
empires bring efficient and benevolent
administration to “de-sovereignized”
territory—geopolitical black holes where neither
international law nor traditional politics operate
on the national-territorial principle—and critics of
imperialism, who insist the ultimate objective of
empire is always thievery—appropriating the richest
assets from weak spaces. The bare facts of
international affairs are continuously being
marshaled as evidence in support of either of these
narratives, depending upon one’s ideological
orientation. Again, we neither wish to praise nor
blame, our aim is to consider how empires actually
function. Our structural criticism offers no reform
programs. On this point, we follow the lead of Lewis
Lapham of Harper’s Magazine, whose editorial
policy has “been more interested in the play of mind
than in its harnessing to a political bandwagon.”
Pursuing the play of ideas is also part of the
Enlightenment legacy, along with the humanistic
struggle of becoming rational and self-determining
beings; a philosophical ethos that we assume.
Theories develop to explain some
reality that is not self-evident, in our case, the
historical process of empires – the general rise and
fall of empires – Western expansion, and the unique
roots of contemporary imperialism. The most
influential explanations of imperialism emerged
around the turn of the 20th century,
which corresponds with the genesis of the “new
imperialism,” the period from 1870 to 1914 when
Western civilization was in a unique position to
penetrate every corner of the earth. Wars throughout
the last quarter of the 19th century were
becoming increasingly economic and matters of
speculation; the great powers made diplomatic
efforts to avoid conflicts within Europe, and hence
catastrophe. Yet, to ensure peace, every state
prepared for war, which also required symbolic
demonstrations of power as well as intelligence
collection on military security.
The underlying causes for imperial
expansion are the same ones being employed now:
namely, the necessity of economics, both in terms of
trade and capital investment, politico-strategic
concerns, such as national interests and security,
and psychological motivations – primitive atavism as
well as civilizing missions. Moreover, economic,
political and ideological explanations of
imperialism are further analyzed on the basis of
metropolitan or peripheral trends; that is, do
empires expand because frontiers naturally attract
them, or do they irrupt outward due to domestic
pressures at the center. In any case, when debating
the various phases of the phenomenon, taking a more
complex or multicausality approach makes sense. On
the other hand, determining the direction of
causality is best left to individual empirical case
studies.
We approach this field of inquiry
through comparative history, social theory and
political analysis. Theory is always grounded in
concepts. The ideal categories, fundamental
concepts, and typologies of “grand theory” and
“macro sociology” are invaluable for studying
Empire. Yet the danger of using abstract notions,
such as status, role, primitive communism, Asiatic
society, feudalism, capitalism, etc, is that they
are distilled from different epochs and societies,
and thus overlook culturally bound facts. Finally,
in order to attempt to overcome the current
epistemological dichotomy between ideology and
knowledge, we apply our original methodology of
combining the “sociology of knowledge” with
“geopolitics,” which aims to unearth the various
strongholds of power and their lines of
communications through material and symbolic space.
The global network economy may function within a
space of flows, but geopolitics revolves around
place and the communication linkages that form the
network nodes of the global system.
We are indebted to the intellectual
giants who emerged around the end of the 19th
century and early 20th century; thinkers
such as Karl Marx, whose reflections on capitalism,
economic classes and bourgeois ideology, etc. are
essential to understanding the significance of 1789
and the passing of power, from those whose wealth
and status stems from the spoils of marauding
ancestors to those who recently produced, extracted,
manipulated or lent it. Max Weber’s comparative
history – designed to reveal the development of
“modern rationality” – paves the way for
constructing a long term but differentiated view of
empire. Emily Durkheim’s analysis of how social
systems function is relevant for studying empires
because they are the largest units in the social
kingdom in regard to social control, which is the
key to Durkheim’s comparative methodology and the
defining characteristic of all social facts.
Finally, Benedetto Croce has shown us how “every
true history is contemporary history.” Croce
corrected the positivists by revealing how history
is both an objective and a subjective matter, or
mental construction.
These various intellectual currents
show us why imperialism needs to be criticized from
both a sociological perspective, which deals with
data perceived externally, and a historical one,
which strives for internal comprehension. Historical
facts, like sociological facts, are always
interpreted from the standpoint of the present. Yet,
the historian’s a priori imagination and
historical account are both influenced by their
contemporary relevance. This is particularly true of
contentious topics or “sites of struggle” or
Kampfplatz that symbolize the primacy of
politics in intellectual life. Most scholarly
attempts at historical revision within this hotly
contested field of imperialism have coincided with a
public debate, such as “neocolonialism.” This is no
different today and actually reflects public
attitudes and current events. “Truth” in the world
of public affairs is, more or less, a matter of
perception shaped through actual consequences.
We aim to bring out all aspects of the
imperial experience from the background and into the
foreground of our collective consciousness. This
means coordinating the phenomena of imperial
expansion from an interdisciplinary perspective. In
order to uncover the less apparent connections
between empire and the disciplines that we
critically use, our intellectual tools have to
examine themselves from the context of their own
history. Empire-building, for example, has
historically affected the sciences and technology as
well as the humanities and arts. Incidentally,
geography, history, anthropology and law from their
very conception in ancient Greece were influenced by
imperial conquest, and it is no accident that
Persia, Greece, Rome, Spain, France and Britain all
did their best legal work during periods of
expansive, imperial enterprise. Incidentally, this
orderly rise and fall of empires is clearly observed
through the pillaging of archaeological sites. The
current great powers always own the cultural
property of past empires. During the 18th
and 19th centuries these disciplines
established themselves as scientific while serving
as practical instruments of empire. When it comes to
the natural sciences, it must be said that many
great scientific discoveries have been influenced by
the needs spurred on from ship building, navigation
and warfare. On the one hand, technology served
imperial expansion; on the other, imperial rivalry
created the need for fresh technology. In any case,
the pace of technological development quickened.
The expansive and integrative scope of
empires even includes language and literature. The
humanities have too often glossed over the harder
aspects of our finest epics, which rejoiced and
embellished the deeds of their regal heroes in
beautiful verse. Only a few literary critics have
drawn out the allusions and references to the facts
of empire in modern European literary culture.
Edward Said suggested that the subjective side of
empire has been energized by myth, rhetoric and
narration: “the power to narrate, or to block other
narratives from forming and emerging, is very
important to culture and imperialism, and constitute
the main connection between them.” Though cultural
imperialism is tied to narrative and the political
economy of information, it is driven by the need to
extend and secure areas of vital interests or
destroy communities that disrupt or threaten
expansion. In short, empires help shape national,
colonized and cosmopolitan identities. The
constructed nature of identity involves cooperation
as well as conquest.
III
Any theory of empire or imperialism must deal with social change. Empire,
one of the oldest and most widely practiced forms of
governance, originated concurrently with the
emergence of civilization or what is known as the
urban revolution. In seeking “to discuss empire in
its entirety across the millennia and across all the
regions of the world,” Dominic Lieven, Russian
historian, argues that power is the central
issue regardless of “the many meanings of ‘empire’
over time and space and the great variety among
imperial polities”(2005). A great variety of
imperial forms have been more diverse than theorists
of modernization originally claimed. Yet, the
greatest distinction between empires has to do with
“modernity.”
Many writers have, indeed, expressed the unity amid diversity in their
account of the transition from traditional to modern
societies in such terms as “folk society” as opposed
to “civilization” or “status society” as opposed to
“contract society” or “Gemeinschaft” against
“Gesellschaft.” Despite the diversity of
“traditional societies,” deep similarities lay
beneath their differences. Land was the basis of the
socio-economic and cultural structure and birth
determined one’s position in society. Both primitive
and agrarian societies shared a common resiliency
towards change because of their dependence on family
kinship structures that values stability and the
sacred over change and secularity. Though the
Faustian pace of Western development and expansion
is what strikes us as historically significant,
social scientists now talk of “multiple modernities.”
Modernization is no longer viewed as uniform and
irreversible because there have been too many local
modifications and variations since the 1950s. Shmuel
Eisenstadt showed how modern societies, like Japan,
had achieved modernity while renewing their own
cultural traditions.
According to Lieven, “Empire is first and foremost a very great power,
which rules over huge territories and a multitude of
peoples and one which is not legitimized by the
formal consent of the people it governs”(Fathom).
Lieven rightly stresses power, but his definition
overlooks social change and the eccentricity of
Western imperialism that was founded on naval and
industrial power, but maintained and extended
through the power of finance capital, which exerted
an extraterritorial influence over most of the
colonial world and the great Asian empires of China,
India, Persia, the Ottomans and Egyptians. It is no
coincidence that only the empires to survive the
First World War intact were democratic ones. Yet
even these had, more or less, unraveled by 1956.
Since then, the costs of military occupation in
non-Western territory have simply become too
expensive. In short, as the international political
economy becomes increasingly interlocked, power is
more efficiently exercised through informal control
in the way that America has since WWII, more or
less, done. Indeed, because the United States seems
to be based on consent, it has been called an
“empire by invitation,” which is also wherein its
limitations lay.
Any discussion of liberal imperialism must begin with the political and
economic consequences of the Anglo-French dual
revolution, which are both manifestations of a
cultural revolution; namely, the secularization of
modern thought that originally developed as a
natural inquiry into and explanation of societal
order. This historic transformation increased
commercial farming, international rivalry, social
misery and the division between “advanced” and
“underdeveloped” societies. Perhaps, the widest
phenomenon was the uprooting of peoples from the
land and the breakup of Herodotus’ king:
age-old-localized custom. Admittedly, the most
significant consequence for our discussion is the
evolution of modern bourgeois society, democracy and
changes in social control: the historic transition
from using suppression—the total restraint and
subjection of the individual—towards manipulation.
Once “the people” emerged from the historical
process, mental manipulation—advertising, publicity
and public relations—became more ubiquitous as well
as sophisticated. Although manipulation became the
main instrument for social control in western
democracies, suppression remained an effective
instrument outside the bourgeois zone.
In the past, the multitude was generally poor, unarmed and uninformed, and
thus easy to command without consent. For centuries,
mankind’s near universal social inequality and
condition of suppression was primarily due to
natural scarcity (impoverishment is reinforced by
cataclysms and epidemics) and secondarily to the
unquestioning attitude towards the underlying taboos
and prohibitions of society, which are blindly
obeyed through the psychic power of the super-ego
that regulates individual behavior by evoking
feelings of guilt. Whereas Lieven prefers
traditional premodern territorial definitions of
empire that emerged out of the Middle Ages over
modern western European maritime ones that developed
more flexible instruments of rule, Paul Kennedy, on
the other hand, has recently suggested that “empire
is now seen more as the exertion of undisputed
influence than as the formal annexation of another
land—i.e., the classical Roman juridical
definition.” This point of view is in complete
harmony with the social sciences and reflects the
rise of the world market, the bourgeoisie class and
their liberal model of politics—all of which
remarkably altered political authority and the
lawful use of force. Thus, by disregarding juridical
categories of empire for influence, which reflects
the actuality of international affairs today, we
define imperialism – as the exercise of effective
control over the sovereignty of another political
society through formal and/or informal means.
Capitalism which stands at the center of the modernization process has
simply demolished other types of polities and social
stratification, such as feudalism, which was
replaced by the class system. Marx genuinely
regarded the state as the executive arm of the
capitalist class. However, Weber correctly pointed
out how the political rulers of Wilhelmine Germany
belonged to the backward economic classes, who
unlike the English nobility after 1832 never really
drew the bourgeoisie into cooperation with it. The
political structure of the liberal state is based
upon the consensus of civil society, which only
calls upon the armed forces when it has to cope with
external or internal disorder. The extent of the
consensus depends upon the ardor in which the ruled
class believes in the legitimacy of the ruling
class, and yet indoctrination can always be used to
artificially enflame the ruling ideology. The
historiography of informal empire provides a subtler
analysis into the mechanics of power as well as the
acceleration of social change since the Age of
Revolution.
The mode in which empires conduct foreign affairs reflects their own
domestic arrangements. Indeed, projecting the body
politic into lawless frontiers becomes an imperial
mission. Revolutionary democracy mobilized large
armies, and changed the rhetoric and ideology of
imperial rule. And this is why almost every movement
since the 18th century has invoked “the
people” in its struggle to wrest power away from
allegedly arbitrary vested interests. After the
French Revolution, European diplomacy and wars no
longer operated within the accepted 18th
century international framework because the validity
of the system itself was undermined by those who had
since Rousseau contested the authority and
legitimacy of the domestic structure of the state.
In reality, most political revolutions have been carried out by men from
the higher and middle classes. Emperor Napoleon
comes to mind here, whose genius fashioned order out
of the chaos of the French Revolution. The novelty
of Napoleon’s imperial system stands out above its
connections to the age old pattern of tyranny and
violence. Napoleon’s ‘civil code’ which came into
power in 1804 made the principles of the French
Revolution the legal norm: freedom, equality and
fraternity. This not only emancipated peasants from
serfdom and handworkers from guild laws, but also
opened offices up to men of merit. The code became
Napoleon’s greatest instrument for his
Machtpolitk.
Napoleon demonstrated how the mystical relationship
between combat effectiveness and ideology could be
actualized through a secular faith. Finally,
Napoleon created a modus operandi for
managing a system of universal suffrage by
manipulating public opinion through the medium of
his subsidized presses in Paris and the provinces,
while employing secret police to spy on social
agitators.
And yet, historically, this liberal vision has not always appealed to
everybody. The great manufacturing and financial
interests who were opposed to the aristocratic and
military castes hardly inspired the peasants, who
became dependent upon the money system for survival
after they had lost their function as units of
self-production. For example, while the emancipation
of Jews in Revolutionary France was celebrated as a
new won freedom, Catholic peasants in Spain and
southern Italy coldly rejected most of these values.
Democratic ideology created a radically different
situation compared with past wars. The peasants of
yore scarcely raised an eyebrow when territories
changed hands from one dynasty to another. For
example, at the beginning of the 18th
century, the War of Spanish Succession was nothing
more than a spectacle for the peasants of Naples,
who witnessed the Austrian Habsburgs replace the
Spanish Bourbons. The same conservative peasant
sentiment towards liberalism existed right up
through the First World War. “Among all the nations
of modern Europe before the World War,” writes
Gaetano Mosca, “Turkey and Russia were the ones
where governmental systems were most in harmony with
the political ideals of the great majority in their
populations. Only a small educated minority were
systematically opposed to the rule of the czar and
the sultan.(229)” Indeed, many sons of the Russian
nobility participated in revolutionary activity,
while the mass populace remained essentially
apathetic. The peasants continued to admire the
nobility and traditional rulers, while western
proletarians were organizing to resist economic
oppression against the feudal and industrial barons;
they were, thus, like the traditionalists, in favor
of “collective solidarity.”
Ruling without the consent of the governed was normal before the 19th
century and the rise of liberal capitalism. Before
the English “working class” came into existence the
multitude of men in the 18th century were
commonly referred to as “plebs” and were neither
considered as a class since they lacked
class-consciousness. The ruling oligarchy only
expected dissent from the upper strata of society.
The governed masses across the globe before the 19th
century identified themselves in terms of religion,
not by nationality or class. Alien rule for the
great uneducated masses was normally interpreted as
rule by another religion, rather than a different
nationality. Popular revolts were, therefore,
usually limited. In short, national and
class-consciousness did not become critical until
the growing interdependence of the capitalist
economy made distinct regions and peoples aware of
their subordination to the work-discipline of
industrial capitalism. In Germany, the educated,
academic, bureaucratic and professional men, who had
for generations occupied a place just under the
aristocracy, were “disturbed by the rise of a
society that accorded equal or superior distinction
to men of crasser aims and morals”(Stern, xxvi).
The British oligarchy in the 19th century showed much more
prudence, skill and tenacity in preserving Empire
through a policy of co-optation than its continental
rivals whose survival depended upon coercion. While
the polyglot Austro-Hungarian Empire did everything
possible to restore world order after 1815, such as
interfere in other countries domestic affairs to
forestall social unrest, Britain in its insular
safety pursued a policy of offshore balancing; for
it only felt threatened, if Europe were to fall
under the domination of a single hegemonic power.
Britain became a permanent part in the concert of
Europe, while following a policy of
“non-interference” in the domestic affairs of
European states. In short, Britain was busy with
ruling most of the world outside Europe.
The pressures of imperial rivalry brought about many internal changes
within European society. Imperial power depends upon
a nation’s determination to stay on top of the
international armaments race, which implies
commanding the productive capacity of its economic
system as well as paying for expensive military
appropriations, such as large naval construction
programs, over the long term without going bankrupt.
Here Spencer’s division between militant and
industrial societies illustrates an important
historical point about British imperialism: namely,
militant societies leave no room for individual
initiative and private enterprise since the state
pervades every aspect of society. In militant
societies individuals serve the state.
Liberal capitalism and industrialism develop
naturally in Lockean societies, where property
rights are secure and individual enterprise valued.
Political liberalism developed in Britain because
this island power had already settled its security
problem through naval power by 1588 and its
Hobbesian problem through the Glorious Revolution of
1688. In short, Britain maintained it global
imperial advantage well into the 20th
century.
The consequences of industrialization reveal a close correlation between
change in modes of production and social structure.
Since society is composed of mutually dependent
parts, a change in one part causes change in other
parts. The kind of productivity required for
economic takeoff created revolutionary social
changes; namely, great upheavals at the bottom of
society: proletarianization—shaping men into an
industrial work force through wage-slavery—created
more social discontent than the non-industrial work
done by serfs, who had for successive generations
worked the same land. The rigid norms of
industrialism and urbanization ran against mankind’s
traditional life patterns; face-to-face social
discourse was replaced by the impersonal conditions
of an urban existence. Though this social upheaval
and cultural despair created a conservative revolt
throughout Europe, “only in Germany did it become a
decisive intellectual and political force.” Fritz
Stern believes “that this particular reaction to
modernity [as embodied in the rational, liberal and
capitalistic society, which in its political form
was shaped by the French Revolution] was deeply
embedded in German thought and society, and that
this curiously idealistic, unpolitical discontent
constitutes the main link between all that is
venerable and great in the German past and the
triumph of national socialism”(xxiii).
Since the beginning of the 19th century, the alienation
associated with the modern industrial system was
intensified by the ups and downs of the market
economy. The booms and slumps have been correlated
with technological innovations in manufacturing.
Moreover, real wealth is made by entrepreneurs who
invest in disequilibriums—imbalances or
opportunities in the economic system created by new
technology. Despite the misery and corruption of the
second half of the 19th century, an
economy of scale and scope began to emerge, which
also made the captains of industry enormous
fortunes. In order to avoid the industrial inferno
of late 19th century radicalism,
foresighted American businessmen began to grasp the
trend towards long term productiveness and the
necessity of developing subtler ways of managing
men.
Henry Ford’s innovations in production, management and marketing at the
beginning of the 20th century transformed
America. Ford devised the assembly-line form of
production; by breaking down work into parts, he
could cheaply employ armies of unskilled workers.
After the First World War, American productive
methods were brought to Europe. Meanwhile, Commander
Trotsky of the Red Army was forcing the unskilled
masses of the newly revolutionary Soviet Union to
work throughout the 1920s. While the “militarization
of labor” was instrumentalized through terror,
compulsory labor was slowly disappearing in core
capitalist industrial areas. Once the economic
conditions of society reach a higher stage of
development, persuasion and consent become much more
effective instruments of social control than
coercion – particularly, in terms of skilled labor.
The pragmatic Americans created a class-conscious
industrial-gentry and an ideology of consumerism,
which formed the two pillars of the corporatist or
fordist strategy. Ford sold his cars cheap enough so
every worker could hope to buy one. Commercialism
was stage-managed by sophisticated advertising,
which simultaneously deflected man’s energy away
from the roots of his dissatisfaction while
redirecting it towards the consumer goods of mass
industrial society. Except for the depression and
war years, the West has hardly taken a pause from
its largely unconscious consumption-related
behavior. The communist command economies simply
never delivered the goods.
IV
Idealists and materialists both agree that in every time and place, a body
politic—from the simplest community to the sovereign
state—is divided between rulers and ruled, leaders
and led. This chasm in human relationships between
rulers and ruled is mirrored once again on the
grandest scale through empires, which is troubling
to anthropologist who attempt to determine where one
social system begins and another ends. In other
words, the attempt to discover pristine communities
to study is distorted in that societies everywhere
have already been caught up in the imperial web.
However, let us look at the isolated example of a
primitive society, where we come closest to
laboratory conditions. A body politic is a
structure, not a system; it consists of “in” and
“out” groups, who compete for privileged positions;
thus, only a minority of a polity can exists at the
top. The power of any ruling minority is constituted
by superior organization that what distinguishes
them from the mass of men who are incapable of
acting uniformly in concert. The reign of mob-rule
is always limited geographically and temporally
because a mob can be dealt with one by one. A ruling
class may be subdivided into a multiplicity of
graded subclasses, depending on the rules for
membership. Order is maintained by those who
regulate the rules of domestic competition for
social position—formal qualifications have depended
upon noble birth, property, religious affiliation
and individual merit. Social mobility throughout
history has been determined by material conditions,
cultural norms and individual ability. On the other
hand, whatever the type of political organization,
pressures arising from the discontent of the
governed masses always exert an influence on the
ruling class, regardless of the ‘political formula’
or principle of sovereignty.
The essential difference between static and dynamic societies lies in
cultural activity. Our first example has to do with
the cultural mutations relating to the urban
revolution, such as the domestication of plants and
animals and the division of labor, which
dramatically changed the course of world history.
Primitive societies, for example, are oriented
towards the older generation and prestigious dead
ancestors and so rarely change by their own
initiative. Class tends to harden into caste as the
warrior and priestly classes strengthen their roles.
For example, Mosca wrote: “In primitive societies
that are still in the early stages of organization,
military valor is the quality that most readily
opens access to the ruling, or political,
class”(195). Cultural norms governing a polity
change either through compulsion or when individuals
respond to challenges within the environment,
allowing society to make advances in organization.
Whenever money and the written word enter a society, the cake of custom is
slowly eaten away. When communities free themselves
of custom and unconscious compulsion, and direct
their attention towards creative personalities and
pioneers, they become dynamic and less deferent. Yet
Robert Michels has shown how every constructed
organization implies the tendency towards oligarchy.
“There is no essential contradiction between the
doctrine that the history is the record of a
continued series of class struggles and the doctrine
that class struggles invariably culminate in the
creation of new oligarchies which undergo fusion
with the old”(254). Since the masses are
permanently incapable of self-government, they are
predisposed to devoting “all their energies to
effecting a change of masters,” which Michels speaks
of as a tragicomedy process.
The Italian economist and sociologist Vilfredo Pareto understood this
domestic movement in terms of a “circulation of
elites.” In dynamic societies the rhythm of
leadership, consists of successive phases in which
change gradually shifts hands from
conservative-regressive groups to
adaptive-innovative ones. Since aristocracies do not
last, there has always been class circulation,
mixing and continuous transformation. The velocity
of the movement depends upon “the supply of and
demand for certain social elements”(266). In
general, warfare, industry and commerce set the
requisites activities bearing on social equilibrium.
Historically, the propertied and educated classes
usurped the privileges from the hereditary
aristocracy by dominating the coercive force of
law—the courts, the police, and the regulatory
agencies—and great economic enterprises. By the
middle of the 19th century, capitalists
and labor replaced emperor, king and lords at the
center of Western and Central European society. The
division of people into “two nations” of owners and
working-class coincided with a change in the field
of ideology; namely, the thirst for universal
suffrage and political incorporation of new groups
regardless of lineage or wealth.
Drawing on the elitist critique of Marxism, the Italian Marxist Antonio
Gramsci argued that the division of power necessary
for the advancement of political and economic
liberalism altered the whole fabric of
society—affecting every strata from the structural
base to the superstructure. Gramsci concisely
divided the superstructure into two great floors:
“that which can be called ’civil society’, i.e. all
the organizations which are commonly called
‘private’, and that of ‘political society’ or the
State, which corresponds to the function of
‘hegemony’ which the ruling class exercises over the
whole of society and to that of ‘direct rule’ or of
command which is expressed in the State and in
‘juridical’ government”(124). Ever since the
historic struggle between civil and political
society struck a balance by abolishing feudalism and
the absolutist state, both floors have increasingly
interpenetrated with another, especially towards the
top stratum. The modern state’s exclusive monopoly
on the use of violence rests on its claim to
guarantee the universal principles of due process of
law and justice, and has the legal power to ensure
coercion through its disciplinarian organs on those
who refuse consent.
The imperial period at the turn to the 20th century is
historically significant because imperialism is
connected with mass democracy—a process that is
ultimately powered from below. Soon after the
emancipation and enfranchisement of the people
implicit in universal suffrage became a mass
experience and reality, the foundations of power
became populist. The power of the masses is
real—popular beliefs have the validity of material
forces. Public sentiment is a force that exists
independently of the mass media. To avoid domestic
chaos, public passion must be accommodated. Since
democracies have, in principle, abolished state
censorship and suppression of dissent, leaders are
left with only one option; namely, deflecting public
attention away from important political and economic
matters and redirecting focus into cultural issues,
celebrity politics or simply
entertainment.
The fascist quickly understood that the masses do not
want responsibility, but would rather be told what
to do, what to believe and what is really true.
Unfortunately, the American psyche is not so
different today. The bedrock of the electorate
hardly reads, watches a lot of television and has
little interest or time for politics. Though
sovereignty in the West now resides with “the
people,” postmodern princes have learned how to
carefully exercise hegemony over the masses by
manufacturing spontaneous consent through television,
a medium wherein perception and appearance
constitute reality. Communications scholars have
shown how information overkill paradoxically results
in nearly the same situation as censorship—truth
gets drowned out in a flood of noise. Control of the
political content of television is the most powerful
means of preventing issues and ideas from becoming
part of the ebb and flow of public debate.
Despite the concentration of power, mass conformity
and malleability of public opinion,
democratization challenges the legitimacy of
governments everywhere, and is the chief reason why
the terms “power” and “influence” have, more or
less, come to express the same reality.
Surely, talk about political, economic, social and psychological pressure
is a metaphor for describing “influence” (direct and
indirect) in human affairs. What does language like
businesses are being squeezed or hammered by the low
“China price” really express? None of these
expressions refer to a natural physical force. Our
subsequent perception of society has made
influence the dominant trope within the social
sciences—the root metaphor of pressure is adapted
from the terminology of the natural sciences. Human
pressures arise out of the implicit tension between
individuality and society, i.e. the
selfish-interests of individuals. Democratic
societies—wherein the value of individuals is
explicitly respected—are according to liberal theory
governed by the rule of law.
In reality, democracies are largely a matter of pressure-group politics in
which innumerable interest groups seek to influence
public opinion, public authorities and executive
bodies to promote their objectives through legal or
criminal means. Internationally, humanly applied
pressure, then, is about projecting both material
and psychological power, which was transformed by
the twin revolutions of the 19th century.
While the industrial revolution changed the
traditional geopolitical sources of power, such as
demographics, weaponry and wealth, the egalitarian
revolution increased the tacit dimension of power,
such as knowledge and bureaucratic efficiency. Even
theories of manipulation have been refined by models
drawn from the field of communications theory, which
insists that perception and reception are creative
acts. The old stimulus-response models in which the
transmitter of messages directly influences the
behavior of recipients have been replaced by models
which acknowledge the ability of recipients to
interpret messages selectively. Scholars, now, speak
of influencing the behavior of a citizen-consumer’s
existing tendencies and shaping world-views rather
than outright manipulation.
V
Definitions of power are no longer limited to the capacity to apply
physical force. There are deeper underlying
structures that make the social construction of
reality possible, such as the ability to supply
finance and services, or to use symbolic power to
shape norms, articulate collective goals, establish
organizational frameworks and institutions. In
short, there are four sources of social power:
military, political, economic and ideological. The
various forms of power are interconnected and cannot
be reduced to one underlying type, such as the
traditional emphasis on physical force, or the
Marxist notion of economic power derived from the
ownership and control of the means of production, or
probably the oldest form of power, social status or
prestige—ideologically, embedded in a sacred
framework. Those who have positions in the great
institutions that monopolize the means of violence,
administration, production and ideas have the most
institutional power. Whether or not a propertied or
bureaucratic class ultimately controls them, is
simply secondary. In sum, the power elite of the
capitalist system exercise all sources of social
power in conjunction with one another; sometimes
converting wealth into force, or knowledge into
wealth, depending on the aim. Skilled and versatile
practitioners wield power efficiently; that is, they
choose the tool that produces maximum effect for
minimum cost.
Western society has been moving towards greater rationalization and
efficiency in not only economic and technological
terms, but also in forms of social control. Power as
it relates to macro-social control has been
generalized into three broad analytic categories:
physical, material and symbolic. Individual action
is always structured within the two dimensions of
time and space and is related to the strains of
society. Everything that affects the body is
physical, and application of physical means of
control is referred to as coercive power.
Material rewards consist of goods and services, and
the use of material means of control is referred to
as utilitarian power. Symbols—the use of
which does not constitute a physical threat or a
claim on material rewards—are objects of the mind
which regulate self esteem-maintenance. The use of
symbols for control is referred to as normative
power. The application of symbolic means of
control tends to persuade people, while that of
material means tends to build up their self-oriented
interests into conformity, and that of physical
means forces people to comply.
Each kind of power and means of control produce different consequences.
Coercive power is the most alienating; normative
power the least and tends to generate more
commitment than utilitarian power, which in turn
generates more commitment than coercive power.
In short, coercion is not conducive to
productive efficiency. Though informal means of
control are more cost effective than the use of
force, coercion is still the ultimate deterrent and
a powerful means of social control, especially the
legitimate use of force. Now, money has become the
most flexible tool for social control because it has
the power to both reward and punish. Western
society’s entrepreneurial, business and managerial
classes cannot be commanded to perform—instead
they have to be induced to work through utilitarian
and symbolic power. The working classes, on the
other hand, are more or less forced to work—they
have to feed themselves.
Most empires usually employ more than one kind of power. We argue that the
successful emergence of maritime empires over
traditional land empires coincides with the shift
from a reliance on a strong central authority and
autocratic command towards control based on the
dynamic division of power. We argue that the modern
stage of historical development in Western society
has undermined the ideology of traditional empires
whose dominance in the world was primarily
maintained through superior arms. In the past,
definitions of empires were limited to the state,
but empires have always exercised influence through
both force and consent upon both political and civil
society. In fact, it is much more cost effective to
establish influence over foreign nations through
informal collaborative mechanisms, such as money
markets.
VI
Empire is a political mechanism for establishing control over regions and
peoples by a single polity. William Langer the
American historian of diplomacy and international
relations defined imperialism as “simply the rule or
control, political or economic, direct or indirect,
of one state, nation or people over other similar
groups, or perhaps one might say the disposition,
urge or striving to establish such rule or control.
Taken in this sense, imperialism is probably as old
as recorded history”(67). The process of imperialism
is as old as civilization, and exists whenever one
polity controls the effective political sovereignty
of another society. Imperialism, like espionage and
counter espionage, will always exist—only the
transitory conditions change, especially in the
techno-economic sphere, which has developed in a
linear direction from pre-industrial, industrial to
post-industrial society.
From the earliest times the political relations among nations have
followed an imperial pattern. The rise and fall of
empires are great revolutions in human affairs.
Strong nations have always imposed their will on
weaker nations. However, there has been little
agreement on the motives that impel states to
expand. Factors have been analyzed in terms of
mankind’s fear and security, lust for power, riches,
glory and god, as well as nationalism and
patriotism. In most cases, however, two causes for
expansion come under scrutiny: the demand for
political security and economic growth. We emphasize
the interaction between politics and
economics—neither is a cause in itself. Politics
interacts with markets and the private sector, and
economics limits the options of policymakers. As the
world moves towards a single market, historians
usually acknowledge the growing importance of
economic factors on the distribution of
power. More specifically, we keep our eye on what
sociologist Daniel Bell calls the techno-economic
sphere of society because its development helps
explain why empires differ in their manner of birth,
growth and decline.
Perhaps, the best way to understand
imperial expansion is by comparing the Pax Romana
and Pax Britannia. Dubious analogies have
been made between the British and Roman empires.
Nevertheless, Rome inspired and served Britain as a
model once Britain became conscious of its imperial
purpose. The men who created the second British
Empire, almost without exception, had a classical
education, which familiarized them with the Roman
Empire. Although both grew
without premeditation or planning and eventually
pursued imperial policies, it is difficult to say
exactly when these policies became fully conscious.
Moreover, the historical origins of their
respective expansions differ considerably in both
cause and effect.
Roman expansion originated in
her struggles to survive. From the beginning,
victory or defeat meant either dominion or
subjection. The government of the Roman
Republic was fully involved from the outset. In contrast,
Great Britain’s
expansion originated from private enterprise, which
was hardly official. In fact, the Crown liked to
maintain a sense of plausible deniability. Geography
gave Britain both a commercial and strategic
comparative advantage in relation to competitors,
though actualization depended upon the knowledge of
and capacity for marine transportation. Since
transport by water is cheaper than by road,
Britain’s multitudinous network of water
communications encouraged commerce. National defense
was the affair of the navy, which, unlike an army,
required greater cooperation and could not be used
for domestic repression.
Britain’s freedom and course
was tied to the “command of the seas.” Nations, like
Great Britain, whose system of values shifted from
feudal honor to having a good credit rating,
explains, in part, why Britain successfully expanded
overseas, while the debt ridden French monarchy
fell. Financial policy was motivated by profit, and
placed a check on imperial policy. Financial and
political elites worked together. The City of
London’s prosperity during the
18th century mirrored the military and
diplomatic victories that expanded the empire.
Rome neither exclusively
followed a policy of enrichment based on trade, nor
expanded with the modern notion of acquiring markets
for export. Rome took possession of territories for
political reasons, so that raw material could be
imported. Max Weber included the role of capitalism
in antiquity in his discussion of ‘the economic
foundation of imperialism.’ He argued that Roman
expansion “was undoubtedly very strongly, though not
exclusively, determined by capitalist interest; and
these interests were above all the interests of the
tax-farmers, office hunters and land speculators.
They were not the interests of groups pursuing a
particularly intensive trade in goods”(164). Roman
history does not show any real parallel with the
kind of initiative allowed to Britain’s trading
companies that ventured to Africa, America and India
or to the sort of development that followed from the
results produced. Britain’s policy of transmarine
territorial annexation began in a competitive search
for trade routes in which the economic motive was
prominent, not from a need to feel secure. The
proverbial flag followed trade. Although the British
empire was short lived in comparison to Rome, its
late nineteenth century bourgeois capitalist
expansion uniquely drew the economic periphery into
a single interdependent world system. Rome came to
an end when the native body politic was overwhelmed
by foreign elements. Britain, on the other hand,
could no longer afford empire after the Second World
War, or stem the ideological tide for national
self-determination that both Soviet and American
rhetoric had launched.
Though American power does
not contain the formal structure of imperial powers,
it remains imperial in practice. Strategic and
geopolitical considerations continue to determine
the substance and focus of power politics, which
contradicts the United States’ internal political
arrangements and rhetoric. Now, after
decolonization, the challenge of establishing
control over an area, such as Afghanistan or Iraq,
is that it appears to the indigenous population as
if the U.S. is pursuing territorial annexation,
which is reminiscent of the age of high or classical
imperialism. This kind of situation quickly leads to
a loss of popular legitimacy and ends up exerting an
enormous amount of international and domestic
pressure against the U.S. government.
VII
We are taking up P.J Cains and A.G. Hopkins’ “case
for placing imperialism and empires at the center of
the study of world history and specifically the
history of globalization”(664). Typically,
“globalization” refers to all the forces that are
driving the world economy and to legislative,
monetary, regulatory and educational harmonization
that have been occurring among disparate
self-governing states with little coercion from any
one central authority. In the 1990s the term was
popularized by journalists, economists, sociologists
and political scientists as the flow of peoples,
goods and services increased. Most thinkers
approximate its origins with the shift from state
mercantilism to open, free-trading policies and to
new developments within technology after the Second
World War. Others believe that globalization arose
in the 1970s, which coincides to the notion of a
post-industrial society, communications and
information revolution, and the oil and capitalist
crisis.
The globalization of capital markets has been
forcing municipal, regional and national governments
around the world to compete for international
investment, pressuring all governments to reduce
their deficits, taxes, and expenditures as well as
privatizing many public services. Still others think
that Anglobalization was introduced by
Thatcher and Reagan as a new strategy to discredit
state-assisted capitalism and to weaken the
sovereignty of Third World nations so that they
would become even more dependent on rich countries’
and their chosen instruments of control—the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Yet
the immediate preconditions of globalization lay
with technology, particularly the rapid diffusion of
distance-abolishing information technologies.
The dominant metaphor of
globalization is the emergence, expansion,
thickening and tightening of webs—or connections
linking people to one another. The theoretical
foundation of globalization is known as convergence
theory in which distinct racial and ethnically
constructed primary communities composed of
villages, tribes and chiefdoms become increasingly
entangled within a global cosmopolitan web.
Historically, loose networks of small roving bands
merged with settled agricultural communities and
were eventually woven into larger linkages, such as
states and empires. Overall, local, national and
regional economies of the world have been
converging, and improving the conditions of the
global market and world-wide production. This
process has no precise definition, but, in the
widest sense, means the increasing
interconnectedness and integration of human
communities. Modern European empires had by the end
of the 19th century gradually forced the
world into a single community with decreasing
diversification. The general direction of history
has been moving towards greater social cooperation
among expanding ingroups—both through consent
and force—that has been driven by the realities of
techno-economic and politico-military competition
among outgroups. Globalization has throughout
most of history been promoted by nationalism and
imperialism. Many economists have simply downplayed
the fact that empires have always been the central
networks of global convergence and have managed the
military, political and economic sectors of the
world systems.
Some advocates of
globalization would have us believe that it not only
represents the end of history, but also the end of
geography. Though there is an implicit historical
and geographical claim being made, namely the
novelty and longevity as well as the
spatiality of the phenomena, historians and
geographers have been uncannily absent from the
debate. Most current popular discourse on
globalization remains ahistorical. Only a
handful of historians seriously looked at these
claims before 2000. One of the primary reasons why
historians had not participated in the debate lies
in the dominant tradition of writing history within
national boundaries; the omission being world and
imperial historians, whose field is supranational
history. Geographer Neil Smith has also pointed out
that ‘globalization’ is fundamentally a geographical
issue, yet it has rhetorically been represented as
total spacelessness. The presupposition that
globalization is powered from some
trans-geographical location is pure ideology.
Manfred Steger differentiates ‘globalization’ the
process from ‘globalism’ the ideology of
globalization. “Like all social processes,”
Steger argues, “globalization contains an
ideological dimension filled with a range of norms,
claims, beliefs, and narratives about the phenomenon
itself”(93). The human art of politics is
embarrassingly corrupt, so it is subordinated to the
abstract science of economics in which money markets
mysteriously determine policy; statesmen and
politicians should not interfere with the omniscient
judgment and operations of the market. Globalists,
like Thomas Friedman, mostly obscure the phenomena
by claiming that this dynamic process embodies a
fundamental and inevitable technological
development. Rather than stressing the conscious
policies of Anglo-American political elites,
Friedman’s Marxist technologically-determined
version of globalization celebrates the shift of the
world’s production to low-cost nations, like China
and India, without explaining its underlying
historical causes.
Globalization for John Gray simply represents the
latest phase of worldwide industrialization. “There
is no systematic connection between globalization
and the free market.” Industrial societies, for
example, developed in both the United States and the
Soviet Union despite their diverse political and
economic systems. The introduction of
industrialization in Western Europe and America may
have been preceded by democratic and capitalistic
revolutions, but this did not prevent
industrialization from being imposed by fiat on
peasant countries lacking both capitalism and
democratic political institutions. Technology and
cheap labor are driving wages down, but economic
growth does not depend purely on population
increase. If it did, then Africa, Latin America,
Indonesia and the Philippines would now be rich.
Nationalism according to Gray has been a key factor
behind every state’s economic takeoff, “and is doing
the same in China and India at the present time.” On
the other hand, nationalism leads to geopolitical
tensions that materialize around the competitive
struggle for transport routes and supply lines to
the planet’s raw materials. The interdependency of
international trade and the delicate web of credit
among industrialized nations hinges upon the
preservation of international peace. Historically,
the international framework for globalization has
been provided by the Pax Britannica and
Pax Americana that gentlemanly capitalism
uniquely produced. Because the current phase of
globalization has, truly, become global, it is
threatened by cowboy capitalism and the race to
secure energy supplies—the Achilles’ heel of
globalization.
Nevertheless, there are
discontinuities in history. An intense awareness of
historic change occurred within the span of a couple
generations. The Second World War and its aftermath
ushered in the transition from a European-centered
world to a world-wide system of international
politics, based on a nuclear balance of power. Every
generation born since
Hiroshima and Nagasaki has
crossed the threshold into a new age. This epochal
change coincided with decolonization and the rise of
global communism and multinational corporations or
two ideological blocks, electronics and automation.
The exact date of
contemporary globalization remains contentious, but
since the fall of Communist block, its
intensification in scope and scale has increased
qualitatively. Bruce Mazlish believes this
qualitative change stems from the greater
synchronicity and synergy among global factors
hitherto unknown, and is what distinguishes the
New Global History from ordinary world history.
In other words, contemporary history is world
history in the fullest sense and if we are going to
understand the forces driving events, a global
perspective must be adopted. Yet, the forces driving
globalization are at root scientific, technological
and what Schumpeter called “institutionalized
innovation,” making the second industrial revolution
the starting-point for the study of contemporary
society; the age of steel, electricity, chemicals
and oil leads to the information age.
Now, this new periodization
or division of epochs, which began shortly after the
Second World War, is governed by the greater
interaction of global forces upon local
reality; nothing that happens in one part of the
world any longer occurs without impacting other
parts. The sense of living upon “spaceship earth” or
within a “global village” epitomizes postmodern
consciousness. Marshall McLuhan wrote that such
postmodern images, “could not have happened before
the electric age gave us the means of instant, total
field awareness”(56), which the many satellites
circling our planet have sensuously provided us.
VIII
Within Western historiography, two
incompatible traditions of writing universal or
global history have existed. The first one was pagan
and cyclical: it emphasized the rise and fall of
empires which was believed to be a result of
unchanging human nature. The second was
Judeo-Christian and linear: it followed sacred
scripture until the Enlightenment when it became
secularized and progressive. Though Romantics
reintroduced cyclic theories into historical
discourse, most historiography was limited to the
ancient Mediterranean, of which Rome was central.
Yet the ancient world encompassed more than
Mediterranean civilization; for example, Rome had
links with other core civilizations or empires.
The philosophy of history
that arose in Europe during the 18th
century was built upon the dim consciousness of
global unity and how a market-system produces a
social good out of the unintended consequences of
self-interested behavior. Europeans had just started
viewing themselves from the outside as well as from
the point of view of their own prehistoric origins.
This perception was first influenced by the
descriptions of new worlds, which came from reports
of sixteenth and seventeenth century explorers,
Jesuit missionaries and business agents. As global
unification itself was occurring, some thinkers
recognized global forces—Adam Smith wrote that “the
immensely facilitated means of communication, draws
all, even the most barbarian, nations into
civilization.” Smith’s “invisible hand” and Hegel’s
“cunning of reason” represent an echo of divine
providence. The Neapolitan professor of rhetoric
Giambattista Vico in 1725 had theorized that men
themselves constructed a world according to a divine
plan without any reflection. Vico’s universal theory
of human history which argued that – “The world of
nations is in fact a human creation.” – was indeed
radical considering that the Holy Inquisition was
still in force.
Enlightenment thinkers used
the reports of the unexplored dark continents of the
world to shed light on similarities between
contemporaneous heathen societies and the pristine
religious beliefs and practices of Greco-Roman
Civilization. Instead of interpreting history as a
series of individual or repetitive events, writers
began to make out the contours of world history,
such as the transformation of life from feudal to
modern society that was occurring in Europe.
Indeed, the modern
philosophy of history begins with the controversial
conception of qualitative differences in human modes
of perception between primitive and civilized
mentalities.
By the late 19th
century, social anthropologists were using
comparative studies to emphasize the psychic unity
of mankind over the sublime gulf that separates
savage from civilized man. This gulf was explained
in evolutionary terms—as a process of general
development from simplicity to complexity. By the
mid 20th century, the anthropologist
Clyde Kluckhohn wrote: “All human societies, from
the ‘most primitive’ to the ‘most advanced’
constitute a continuum”(266).
However, we cannot speak
about 19th century social theory without
mentioning the influence of the Romantic Movement,
which was triggered by European events. Georg Lucaks
argues that “It was the French Revolution, the
revolutionary wars and the rise and fall of
Napoleon, which for the first time made history a
mass experience.... In its defensive struggle
against the coalition of absolute monarchies, the
French Republic was compelled to create mass armies.
The qualitative difference between mercenary and
mass armies is precisely a question of their
relation with the mass of the population”(23). The
quantitative expansion of war created a
qualitatively new situation, a broadening of men’s
horizons across the whole of Europe, who began to
comprehend the historical determinedness of their
own existence. Finally, the Napoleonic wars awakened
a wave of national feeling outside of France that
created an interest in national history, folk ways
and primitive societies.
Though human affairs
transcend civilizational boundaries, discourse on
world history was geographically limited to Europe
until around the time of the First World War. The
nation-state had throughout the 19th
century captured the imagination of the first
professional historians. The rest of the world had
to wait for Oswald Spengler to publish his
metaphysical, de-centering morphology of world
history in 1918, before it could really enter the
picture. Rapid social disintegration between the
interwar years inspired philosophical minded authors
to write about a plurality of separate civilizations
around the globe in a single narrative. Arnold
Toynbee’s discovery of a plot, a rhythm, and a
predestined pattern in history remains unconvincing
despite his erudition. Arguments for general
properties, uniformities and continuity are too
abstract. World history must take account of
fortuitous contingencies. Chance occurs in war,
again and again, and changes the outcome of events.
Neither the commercial nor the intellectual life of
mankind is intelligible without reference to its
military history. Military and diplomatic historians
have shown how men’s actions are governed by passion
rather than reason; and passion is too unpredictable
to conform to any pattern—meta-logic is a product of
meta-narrative.
William McNeill salvaged an
important thread in Toynbee’s narrative of world
history, by concisely pointing out a continuous web
of events in Eurasia, or what he calls the
Oikumene, and what Sir Halford Mackinder
in 1904 called the World Island: the
geographical zone stretching from eastern Asia to
western Europe and southward to include south Asia
and northern Africa. The unification of the world
was historically unique. The conquest and closing of
all frontiers meant that there was not any
open-space left for outlets of surplus populations.
McNeill’s work united the two traditions of
historiography by showing the local rise and fall of
particular empires against a larger
transcivilizational pattern of relationships and
processes that have interacted through time from an
initial core in Mesoptamia. Since the worldwide
system of production and consumption transcends
regional, national and civilizational boundaries,
MacNeill has come to focus on communications
networks which unite peoples, nations and states, as
well as liberalism and Marxism, the two great
intellectual traditions of 20th century
historiography. In short, communications forms the
skeleton of world history. Transport and
communication have always provided the basic frame
within which human societies must exist.
Communication between civilizations is exemplified
by the opening of the
Seidenstraße
between China, India, Persia, Egypt and Rome during
classical antiquity and its disintegration of the
Silk Route after the Mongol era.
IX
The regular trading of luxury
goods over established long distance routes
dramatically increased, once humans began to settle
down in one place, which incited man to improve his
transporting capacity and in turn led to greater
specialization and productiveness. Neolithic
agriculture and metallurgy led to a division of
labor and social hierarchy. As primary needs were
met, man accumulated surpluses in goods and distant
specialities. Lewis Mumford has shown how all of
these functions related to “a new urban institution,
the market, itself largely a product of the
securities and regularities of urban life”(City,
71). More
important than the transportation and distribution
of goods in the market was its by-product: the
communication system of recording market
transactions: linguistic and numerical notation and
the invention of the alphabet.
In ancient times,
communication and transportation networks were part
of one emerging
infrastructure.
Long distance trade required the establishment of
settlements wherever environmental variations along
routes required the transfer of goods from one mode
of transportation to another. Trade in goods and the
migration of peoples at first moved through the
earth’s natural arteries, such as rivers, valleys
and coastlines. Many cities originated as
settlements, trading-posts, military encampments,
forts or bases at break up points in the
transportation system of the time. Empires
eventually integrated rule over vast areas
containing former independent units linked only by
trade relations. Ancient communication-nets, such as
Roman roads and sea routes, facilitated rapid
movement of mass quantities of military, political
and economic goods necessary for an integrated
political system. As empires expand they either try
to exploit and control existing communication-nets
(in which they are embedded), or forge new ones.
The scale has dramatically
changed since Gutenberg and
Columbus initiated the long
Communications Revolution during the 15th
century. Any list of the long Communications
Revolution must, also, include the father of modern
accounting, the largely unremembered Italian
Fransican monk, Fra Luca Paccioli, who in 1494
published the Summa Arithmetica, which
included the first detailed description of double
entry bookkeeping. Oswald Spengler ranked it in
importance with
Columbus’ discovery of the New
World and Copernicus’ theory of the earth rotating
around the sun. Goethe described it as “one of the
finest discoveries of the human intellect.” A
version of the text had reached England and Scotland
in the Elizabethan age, and there flourished as
Britain embarked on its great era of exploration,
with joint stock companies financing the ventures.
It became even more important during the 18th
century, when the laws on the limited liability of
corporations were passed. All modern accounting
depends on the principles he enumerated. Our
contemporary computerized accounting machinery could
not function without them, as well as the great
corporations which would flounder in a fiscal fog.
Its velocity remarkably increased around 1850 with
the advent of Paleotechnology—the burning of carbon
energy—and the advent of power-driven ships, the
railway, telegraph, radio, etc. The term
‘communications’ used to refer to what we now call
transportation because originally transportation
networks like roads, canals, railways and steamships
carried information as well as people and cargo.
Steamboats followed the routes laid out by
nature, while railroads formed the routes
themselves, their construction were not completely
constrained by the natural environment. Railroads
historically exemplify both human inventiveness and
cultural autonomy: On the Frontier the railway had
the power to make a path of settlement, bringing
forth populations where there had been none. Just as
submarine cables naturally followed shipping routes,
telegraph lines developed alongside railway tracks.
The passage of information still depends on the good
and efficient maintenance of the lines of physical
transport, which carry information from point A to
point B. The new terminology of dividing
transportation from communications occurred after
the invention of the telegraph and wireless. In
short, information flows quickened with the
emergence of steam and electrical communication
infrastructure.
Electronic media is not new, though it
is often assumed to originate “only with the
institutional birth of film and broadcasting and the
development of large audiences in the twentieth
century,” the application of
electricity to communication media had already begun
during the second half of the 19th century. Daniel
Boorstin called the information phase of the
communications revolution the great, but
inconspicuous Graphic Revolution. According to
Boorstin, inventions like printing, electric
telegraph, photography, wireless, film and
television reflect: “Mans ability to make, preserve,
transmit, and disseminate precise images—images of
print, of men and landscapes and events, of the
voices of men and mobs.” Since the 19th
century, “a larger and larger proportion of our
experience, of what we read and see and hear, has
come to consist of pseudo-events”(12).
Considering the whole experience of visual culture,
Walter Lippmann suggested nothing compares with
motion pictures as a visualization aid. Photographic
pictures have a real immediacy and authority over
the imagination; they make building up imagery much
easier than the evocation of words. The man in the
street’s world is mostly made up of images from mass
media—the eyes, ears and mind of modern society.
Since propaganda developed with new mass media, it
has become central for social control. Techniques
for managing perception appeal to sub-rational and
even sub-conscious levels of human motivation. Radio
allowed state authorities to centrally penetrate the
daily consciousness of semiliterate populations in
the transition from traditional to modern society.
On the other hand, the mass media in
democratic-capitalist societies has been more
influenced by market pressures than by the
state—except for matters involving national
security. Besides analyzing the modern means of
communication, sociology looks at the social
institutions of media, especially news
organizations.
Arnold Toynbee argued the technological means of
communication and transportation have made the world
conductive to every form of human intercourse.
However, no eventual political unification which the
new world-wide network of communications foreshadows
has occurred. He suggested that “political unity
might be imposed by the familiar method of the
knock-out blow, but the price of unification by
force, in terms of moral, psychological, social, and
political (not to mention material) devastation
would be relatively higher than it had been in other
cases of the same kind”(24). Though the world is now
linked together horizontally, there is no central
government, or authority, whose command is
hierarchically structured. The United Nations is the
only organization that comes close to such an ideal,
but in reality it is toothless. In terms of hard
power, the U.S. comes closest, but it does not have
legitimate command over many parts of the world,
especially Russia and China who are permanent
members of the Security Council.
X
The archeological record
since pre-historical times reveals the existence of
long distance communications networks of peoples,
commodities, ideas and diseases passing through
different centers of administrative control.
Hunter-gather bands, for example, started
long-distance trading over 40,000 years ago. Today,
we call these material and nonmaterial
transcivilizational exchanges globalization. The
ancient empires of the Middle East were the first to
accumulate capital, and capture and organize
communication-nets. However, this process did not
begin to become truly global until around the 15th
century with the rise of long-distance overseas
empires. Yet, even then, trade and cultural
exchanges occurred within an imperial center and its
colonies. International trade became trade within an
empire. Both mercantilism and the Westphalia system
were based on the principle that no authority
operated above the inter-sate system. The pressures
of war and trade between European nation-states
stimulated science and technology—reinforcing the
rise of global empires. When Britain shifted from
state mercantilism to free market policies in the 19th
century “Free-Trade Imperialism” was born. In
contrast, to established principles, the new
metaphysical entity of the “world market” subjected
the old laws operating within and between states to
its higher metaphysical authority. The dynamic
history of the last five hundred years radically
altered traditional ancient political and economic
relations and practices. Colonialism and imperialism
have mixed up the categories of exploitation with
industrial progress, development and benefaction.
The money that imperial Britain spent in India and
other parts of her empire is difficult to
categorize.
Economically, globalization
means the tendency towards the integration of the
world into a single market. The driving force behind
globalization is free market capitalism in which
everything gravitates towards the bottom-line.
American-style shareholder capitalism dominates the
world’s financial markets and influences the
decisions of CEOs, who are not free from the
pressure of investors and fund managers—who are
hungry for dividends and takeovers. This process is
more than economic for it also transforms political,
social, and cultural relationships across all kinds
of geographical borders. In cultural matters, the
ideology of the bottom-line tends to reinforce the
dumbing-down of society. Yet the most overlooked
point in much of the debate on globalization is the
historical fact that political decisions made inside
the Anglo-American empire created the process in the
first place. The consequences of power balancing and
global economic forces are always related to human
agency. Considering the relationship between empire
and globalization, Niall Ferguson rhetorically asks,
how did the liberal legal, financial and
administrative institutions spread around the world
as far as they did?
In a few rare cases there was a
process of conscious, voluntary imitation. But more
often than not, European institutions were imposed
by main force, often literally at gun point. In
theory, globalization may be possible in an
international system of multilateral cooperation,
spontaneously arising as Cobden envisaged. But it
may equally well be possible as a result of coercion
if the dominant power in the world favors economic
liberalism. Empire is the instance that springs to
mind.(xxiii)
Indeed, markets hardly work without strong
governmental institutions. Instead of stressing
groundless ideological assertions, such as the
universality and inevitability of globalization, we
emphasize the role of leadership in creating global
enforcement mechanisms. Though all imperial powers
aspire to create a world order, imperial Britain was
really the first to create a global order when she
took control of the seas from Spain in July 1588 and
which was more or less enforced until1945 when the
United States replaced her as the dominant power on
the periphery of the central Eurasian land mass (Sir
Halford Mackinder’s ‘heartland’). America not only
filled the war’s power vacuum, but initiated a novel
policy of granting foreign aid to promote
development and self-government in the non-communist
world.
The historical relationship between globalization and empire is one of
cause and effect. We contend that empire is the
cause and globalization the effect. The invisible
hand of the market has always needed the strong arm
of empire to protect and guide international flows
of people, information and capital. In The
Inadvertent Empire William E. Odom, retired
general and ex-director of the National Security
Agency, notes that globalization needs order to
exist: “Without the U.S. empire there would be wars
and anarchy, and therefore, no globalization. The
economic activity known as globalization is an
effect, not a cause”(53). Most supporters of liberal
globalization have simply overlooked the historical
fact that globalization has been promoted by Western
imperialism: “What is universalism to the West is
imperialism to the rest”(184). Nevertheless,
India’s Deepak Lal praises empire, which has severed
as a governance mechanism for disparate peoples who
otherwise would have been trapped in the conflicts
and inefficiencies of anarchy. The rise of India has
undoubtedly benefited from Western imperialism and
capitalism. Lal suggests that the spreading of
Western moral values instead of material values
constitutes a real danger for Washington.
Several high ranking US generals have suggested that Afghanistan and Iraqi
society cannot be transformed by military means
alone. Yet Niall Ferguson in Vanity Fair
remarked that the problem in Iraq “is a simple one
of numbers, or a chronic manpower deficit, which
means it cannot put enough boots on the ground to
maintain law and order in conquered territory. This
is not because it lacks young men.” Rather, because
“it chooses, for a variety of reasons, to employ
only a tiny proportion of its population (half of 1
percent) its armed forces, and to deploy only a
fraction of these in overseas conflict zones.”
America’s downsized military “has left it with too
few combat soldiers to make a success of imperial
policing—a labor-intensive task that renders
redundant much of its high–tech hardware.”Yet the real problem has less to do with
demographics than with the general will of the body
politic and its national character.
Deployment levels are so low because America’s depoliticized population,
like most other developed industrial nations, is
primarily based on capital accumulation—the drive
for wealth acquisition, consumption and
entertainment. David Riesman in the 1950s had
already pointed out how American young men were
being trained for the frontiers of consumption
rather than production and warfare, and how American
voters were spectator-consumers of politics. Public
opinion in developed societies has dramatically
turned against war. Unless there is a dramatic
threat, people are not willing to sacrifice their
life for vague justifications based either on
geopolitical calculations or idealism. If leaders
want to engage in war, they have to manage public
perception and wage “instant wars,” before a Vietnam
War syndrome kicks in. Thus, any politician who
introduces conscription, today, commits political
suicide. In short, not enough Americans are willing
to go off to the Middle East in the numbers required
to provide security and stability, let alone
reconstruction and development.
Perhaps, if Ferguson had read Zbigniew Brzenzinski’s The Grand
Chessboard, which in 1997 completely predicted
the challenges of controlling Eurasia, he would not
have been so surprised to realize that: “American
hegemony involves the exercise of decisive influence
but, unlike the empires of the past, not of direct
control. The very scale of Eurasia, as well as the
power of some of its states, limits the depth of
American influence and the scope of control over the
course of events. That megacontinent is just too
large, too populous, culturally too varied, and
composed of too many historically ambitious and
politically energetic states to be compliant toward
even the most economically successful and
politically preeminent global power.” Brzenzinski’s
analysis of American society is very revealing:
“America is too democratic at home to be autocratic
abroad. This limits the use of America’s power,
especially its capacity for military intimidation.
Never before has a populist democracy attained
international supremacy. But the pursuit of power is
not a goal that commands popular passion, except in
conditions of a sudden threat or challenge to the
public’s sense of domestic well-being…. Democracy is
inimical to imperial mobilization”(35-36). Fiscal
need and geographical comparative advantage limited
Britain’s involvement in Europe to diplomacy and
playing the Great Game of forestalling a single
dominant state. Britain’s hegemonic relationship to
overseas underdeveloped and developing countries in
the 19th century rested on its naval and
financial power, but British hegemony certainly
wasn’t capable of controlling the center of the
global balance of power, or what A.J.P. Taylor
called “the struggle for the mastery in Europe.” The
United States should learn from Britain’s imperial
past, and forget trying to either master or
transform Eurasia—a delusional project for the 21st
century.
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